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INSURANCE-1960 TENNESSEE SURVEY
WILLIAM R. ANDERSEN*

I. INTERESTS PROTECTED
A. Propertyand Liability Insurance
B. Life and DisabilityInsurance

1. InsurableInterest

2. Interest of the Beneficiary

II.

SELECTION AND CONTROL OF RISKS
A. Defining the Insured Event

B. Other Risk Control Techniques

III.

MARKETING AND SERVICING INSURANCE

A. Making the Contract
B. Disposition of Claims

I. INTERESTS PROTECTED
A. Property and Liability Insurance
There were no cases during the survey period involving questions
of the nature or measurement of interests protected by property or
liability insurance.
B. Life and DisabilityInsurance
1. Insurable Interest.-In Volunteer State Life Ins. Co. v. Pioneer
Bank' the court held that a person who stood in loco parentis to a
minor, and who had agreed to take custody of the child and provide
it a home pending a decision regarding adoption, had an insurable
interest in the child's life. This holding is based on a dictum in an
earlier Tennessee case 2 and has support in the few cases which have
passed on the question.3 Although the consent of the person whose
life is being insured is usually necessary for a valid contract of
insurance procured by another,4 the court here applied the sensible
rule (adopted by statute in some states 5) that consent is not necessary
* Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; Faculty Editor, Vanderbilt Law Review.
1. 327 S.W.2d 59 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1959).
2. Merriam v. National Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 169 Tenn. 291, 86 S.W.2d 566
(1935). The statement is dictum in the case since the insured himself pro-

cured the policy and thus no question of insurable interest existed.
3. See, e.g., Thomas v. National Benefit Asc., 84 N.J.L. 281, 86 Atl. 375
(1913); Carpenter v. United States Life Ins. Co., 161 Pa. 9, 28 Atl. 943 (1894);
29 Am. JUR. Insurance § 480 (1960); 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 207 (1945); 25
A.L.R. 1547, 1548 (1923).

4. See Bransom v. National Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 4 Tenn. App. 576 (W.S.

1927); Interstate Life & Acc. Co. v. Cook, 19 Tenn. App. 290, 86 S.W.2d 887
(E.S. 1935).
5. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. § 22:616 (1959); N.Y. INS. LAw § 146 3 (b);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-19-5 (Supp. 1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-330 (Supp.

1953).
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where a parent insures an infant incapable of giving consent.
2. Interest of the Beneficiary.-Two aspects of the Pioneer Bank
case need further comment. The beneficiary was also the owner
of the policy, having procured the policy, having paid all the
premiums and alone having the right to direct disposition of the
proceeds. In addition, the person entitled to the proceeds was an
assignee of the beneficiary-an organization which itself had no
insurable interest in the infant's life. The court had no difficulty
holding that a policy validly issued to one with an insurable interest
could be transferred to an assignee without insurable interest so
long as the whole transaction was in good faith and not an attempt
to avoid the insurable interest rule. This is now the settled rule
in a majority of jurisdictions 6 including Tennessee 7 and provides a
sound yet flexible basis for resolving these disputes.8 In a case such
as this, allowing the assignee to recover accords to the ownerbeneficiary power over the disposition of the proceeds which is
consistent with his ownership status.
Not all owner-beneficiaries fare so well. In Grossman v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of America9 the insured had provided by several endorsements to the policy that the beneficiary (the insured's wife) was to
receive the proceeds in installments for 20 years, remainder in case
of her earlier death to go in lump sum to her children. On the day
the last endorsement was made, the insured also had a rider attached
transferring "all incidents of ownership and control" of the policy,
"including any and all benefits, values, rights, options and privileges"
to the beneficiary. On the death of the insured husband, the wife
requested that the insurer pay her the proceeds in a lump sum.
She was joined in her request by all other interested parties and
contended that as sole owner of the policy she could decide the
mode of payment. On the insurer's refusal to make a lump sum payment, the wife brought suit. The court held that although the transfer
of ownership gave the wife the right to change the contract to provide
for lump sum payment, such change must necessarily be made before
the death of the named insured. On his death, the court reasoned,
all rights under the contract became irrevocably vested and were not
subject to change.
The application of this well established proposition to the instant
6. See Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 1313 (1953). Compare Grigsby v. Russell, 222
U.S. 149 (1911) with Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775 (1881).
7. Hammers v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America, 188 Tenn. 6, 216 S.W.2d
703 (1948); Clement v. Insurance Co., 101 Tenn. 22, 46 S.W.2d 561 (1898).
8. For a discussion of the minority view that there can be no assignment
to an assignee without an insurable interest, see PATrESONV, ESSENTIALS OF
INSURANcE LAW § 41 (2d ed. 1957).
9. 325 S.W.2d 811 (M.S. Tenn. 1959).
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case deserves close attention. Appended in the note ° are two typical
authorities upon which the court relies. In the usual case, finalizing
all rights under the contract on the death of the insured is a way of
preventing the frustration of the insured's desires by acts of his
representatives" or by the insurer.1 2 It is a device for insuring that
the person entitled to direct disposition of the proceeds, usually the
insured, is in fact able to exercise that privilege, free from subsequent
interference by others. Stated this way, it should be apparent that
the insured's rights in this regard derive from his status as "owner"
(the person entitled to direct disposition of the proceeds) and not
from the fact that it is his life which is insured. It would seem to
follow that when the insured has fully terminated his status as
"owner," and the new owner requests a modification of the contract,
the rule applied is irrelevant. Observe that in both statements of the
rule quoted in note 10, supra, the author assumes that the insured
has reserved some right or power over the proceeds and thus retains
ownership status. Absent such status, when the insured's death has
matured the contract, the company's obligation is a simple agreement
with the owner-beneficiary to pay her the proceeds. The terms of the
agreement here happen to call for installment payments, but there
is no reason to treat this as different from any other contractalterable by the interested parties when they so choose.
To be sure, if the company had an interest in the mode of payment, it would be entitled to stand on its contract. But in this case
the company concedes (in its brief, p. 10) that "so far as the Prudential is concerned, the question presented in this case is academic.
... The Prudential stands to win or lose nothing, monetarily, however
the case is decided, because the settlement under the monthly payment plan is the actuarial equivalent of the lump sum value at date
of death."
If neither the company nor the owner-beneficiary were interested in
the mode of payment specified by the contract, it must be concluded
that the only obstacle to the modification of the contract was the
10. "Whatever may be the variant opinions and different descriptions of
the beneficiary's interest during the lifetime of the insured, it is everywhere
held that the insured's reserved power to extinguish the beneficiary's interest
ceases at his death, and cannot be exercised by his personal representatives
or assignees. The beneficiary's rights then become completely fixed." VANCE,
INSURANCE 680 (3d ed. 1951).

"And, although an insured has reserved the right to change the beneficiary,
if he does not do so, either in fact or in legal effect, such right does not
survive; rather, the rights of the named beneficiary vest at the instant of
the insured's death, and cannot be affected by any subsequent act of the
insurer." 2 CoucH, INSURANCE 828 (1929).

11. This seems the thrust of the rule quoted from VANCE, op. cit. supra note
10.
12. This seems the purpose of the rule quoted from CoucH, op. cit. supra
note 10.
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court's solicitude for the intent of the insured-an insured who voluntarily divested himself of all control over the policy. This paradox,
toward the end of the opinion, issues in a flat contradiction. On the
one hand the court denies "authority to order the company to pay
in a lump sum contrary to the specific provisions of the policy"presumably out of respect for some manner of "vested" rights of the
insured. At the same time the court said "the company would be
fully justified in acceding to [the beneficiary's] request in making a
lump sum settlement rather than insisting as it does upon the strict
terms of the beneficiary provision"-a recommendation 13 which necessarily involves the conclusion that the insured has no rights whatsoever. An opinion in this form makes a doubtful precedent.
Nor do the practical consequences of this decision justify the logic
of the opinion. In divesting himself of all control over the policy, the
insured was no doubt seeking to minimize estate taxes by preventing
the inclusion of these proceeds in his gross estate.14 Should he at the
same time have intended to retain "informal control" over the disposition of these proceeds (by any means available for maintaining
"informal control" over the beneficiary), this kind of decision would
guarantee the continuing efficacy of that control and therefore the
success of the entire plan. Thus by refusing to allow a wife to
exercise her lawful choice when she is free of the control of her
husband (and perhaps learns for the first time that she has a choice 15 )
a court may find itself acting as a necessary agent in a duplicitous
scheme of tax avoidance.

II.

SELECTION AND CONTROL OF RISKS

A. Defining the Insured Event
One of the most delicate problems in insurance underwriting is
that of describing the events whose occurrence is the primary con13. The company did not accept the court's suggestion and insisted on
payment in installments.
14. That this was the tactical problem is conceded in the company's brief
on appeal (p. 10).
15. This perhaps not uncommon device for maintaining informal control
proved unsuccessful in Tyre v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 353 P.2d 725 (Cal. 1960)
where the court reversed a lower court decision and allowed the wife to
receive one half the face amount of the policy in lump sum as her community
property election, although the insurance contract had been modified by the
insured husband to provide for installment payments. The court was not
overly bothered by the contract. "[A]lthough the payment of the insurance
proceeds is a matter of contract between the insured and the insurer, the
insured's exercise of his unilateral right under the contract to select the
beneficiary is testamentary in character . . . . [and] he cannot defeat her
interest by making a testamentary gift to her under conditions that restrict
her management and control of the property." 353 P.2d at 729. In this case,
the husband had made no transfer of ownership of the policy as in the
Grossman case; the wife's rights were a result of the community property law.
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dition of the insurer's obligation to pay. Several interesting cases
were decided during the survey period involving disputes over
16
whether or not an insured event had occurred.
In Britton v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America17 the supreme court
was faced with the complex problem of determining liability for
accidental death under the double indemnity provision of a life
insurance policy where the accidental death was in part caused by
pre-existing disease. The policy provided for accidental death benefits
where the death occurred "as a result, directly and independently
of all other causes, of bodily injury, effected solely through . . .
accidental means," and further, that no benefits were payable if the
death resulted "directly or indirectly from bodily or mental infirmity
or disease in any form." The 70-year-old insured suffered a broken
hip in a fall and died shortly after undergoing an operation to reduce
the fracture. The cause of death was certified as "acute coronary
thrombosis." The medical testimony made it clear that (1) but for
the fall the insured's arteriosclerosis (normal hardening of the
arteries) would not have resulted in his death, and that (2) but for
the arteriosclerosis, the fall and resulting operation would not have
resulted in death. Did an insured event (death from bodily injury
not caused directly or indirectly by disease) occur?
The cases grappling with this difficult problem are numerous. 18
General principles with real meaning are virtually absent, both because policy forms defining this event vary materially and because no
two sets of facts present the same degree of relationship between the
disease, the injury and the death. Where the accidental injury itself
produces a disease (e.g., gangrene following an injury) the settled
16. In addition to the cases discussed in the text, several others involved
the determination of whether or not an insured event occurred. In Throneberry v. Resolute Ins. Co., 332 S.W.2d 227 (Tenn. 1960) it was held that where
an insured automobile was damaged when an escaping convict forced the
insured to drive it to another state, there was a "larceny" with policy
coverage for "theft or larceny." The company's odd contention that this was
robbery (which necessarily includes larceny) rather than larceny was rejected by the court. For further discussion of this case, see Kendrick,
CriminalLaw-960 Tennessee Survey, 13 VAND. L. Rpy. 1065 (1960). In Lowe

v. Caledonian-American Ins. Co., 324 S.W.2d 420 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1959) the
court held that testimony that a cracked wall had been standing in that
condition 16 or 17 years, coupled with evidence of storm and wind conditions
in the vicinity at or near the time the wall collapsed, warranted finding by
trial court that damage to wall was caused by windstorm and not inherent
vice.
In Zarzour v. Southern Life Ins. Co., 333 S.W.2d 14 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1959)

it was held that an insurer owes no "affirmative duty to inquire whether an
applicant [for group life insurance] falls within an excluded class." The
insurer thus was not estopped from denying coverage under policy issued
to 73-year-old insured and providing for termination when insured reached
seventy years of age.
17. 330 S.W.2d 326 (Tenn. 1959).
18. See the extensive annotation in 131 A.L.R. 240 (1941).
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rule appears to allow recovery. 19 It also seems clear that where the
accident alone would have produced death, the existence of a disease
will not preclude recovery. 20 But when the disease antedates the
injury and combines with it in some degree to produce the loss, the
authorities are very much divided. An apt summary was made by a
federal court of appeals:
The slight weight of authority holds that as a matter of law where
the accident aggravates the disease, or the disease aggravates the
consequences of the accident, there can be no recovery. Under this view
there could be a recovery, where the disease contributes to the injury
or death, only if the accidental means is so violent or far reaching that
it would have brought about the same result as a natural consequence,
without the aid of the disease, but possibly at a later time. A directly
contrary view is expressed by those cases permitting recovery as a
matter of law on a showing that the disease alone would not have caused
the result at the time it did occur, although the result of death is
hastened thereby. Some courts refuse to follow either of these extremes
but take a middle position. They borrow from the law of negligence
and leave it to the jury to decide whether the disease or the accident is
the proximate cause of injury or death. In so doing they sprinkle their
opinions freely with such participles and 21adjectives as producing, predominating, efficient, passive and remote.
A verbal formula often used in the Tennessee cases has been "actively
contributed." If the disease "actively contributed" to the death, there
can be no recovery.2 2 The difficulty comes in determining what
constitutes an active contribution. A clear case was Wheelock v.
Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co.23 where the insured was suffering
from an advanced cancerous condition which so weakened him as to
lead the court to presume that it caused his fall. The injury from the
fall aggravated the pre-existing condition and resulted in the insured's death. The court affirmed a directed verdict for the insurer.
But in Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Campbell,24 the "disease"
was, as in the instant case, only a normal hardening of the arteries.
A severe shock caused by the death of another combining with the
arteriosclerosis resulted in a cerebral hemorrhage-a consequence
19. See cases cited in 29A Am. JuR. Insurance § 1213 (1960); 45 C.J.S. Insurance 813-14 (1946); VANcE, INsURANcE § 188 (3d ed. 1951). Conversely,
where the disease produces the accident there will probably be no recovery.
See Wheelock v. Provident Life &Ace. Ins. Co., infra note 22.
20. Provident Life & Ace. Ins. Co. v. Ivy, 18 Tenn. App. 106, 73 S.W.2d 706
(1934).
21. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Young, 103 F.2d 839, 841 (3d Cir. 1939). For an
excellent statement of the problem and a realistic appraisal of the authorities
see Note, Pre-existing Disease and Accident Insurance: Pathology anc
Metaphysics in the Common Speech of Men, 21 U. Cni. L. REv. 266 (1954).
22. Wheelock v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 10 Tenn. App. 184 (E.S.
1929); Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 18 Tenn. App. 452, 79
S.W.2d 292 (E.S. 1934).
23. Wheelock v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., supra note 22.
24. Provident Life & Ace. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, supra note 22.
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that would not have followed from the shock alone. Still, the court
reversed a jury verdict for the beneficiary and dismissed the complaint on the ground that the arteriosclerosis "actively contributed"
to the death. A more lenient view was recently taken in North
American Ins. Co. v. Ellison25 where the 72-year-old insured was
suffering from "a number of chronic organic diseases including
impaired kidney function, hardening of the arteries, an enlarged
heart and bronchitis. . . ." A fall resulting in a broken ankle required
that the insured remain in bed. She died within two weeks. Summarizing the medical testimony, the court said that "while the chronic
conditions and diseases with which insured was suffering did not
cause death and were entirely compatible with life, the cumulative
effect of the heart, lungs and kidneys being unable to function
properly made it impossible for insured to survive confinement in
bed." Despite what would appear to be the "active contribution" of
these diseases, the court allowed the jury to find that the "disease and
age merely furnished a condition causing death to follow from a chain
of events set in motion by the accident." The court said that where a
physical infirmity merely lowers resistance to the effects of an injury,
the death may still be caused "independently of all other causes" by
the injury. The court suggested, too, that perhaps these cases could be
better decided by the jury, noting that it was "hardly.. . the function
of the court to say as a matter of law when old age and not the effects
of an accident becomes the predominant cause of disability or death."
The court in the instant case, however, relied on the strict view of
the Campbell case and directed a verdict for the insurer. Indeed, the
court seemed to go beyond Campbell, for in its conclusion "active
contribution" becomes mere "cooperation." If, "at the time of the
accident.., there was an existing disease which, cooperating with the
accident and resulting in ... death ... the accident cannot be considered as the sole cause of the death or as a cause independent of
all other causes."
Three automobile cases presented difficult construction problems
regarding the physical relationship of the insured to the vehicle. In
Bowlin v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.26 the court held
that an injury sustained by the insured while pushing his stalled
vehicle was not an injury incurred while "in or upon" the automobile.
Considering the phrase unambiguous and thus construing "upon"
in its ordinary literal sense, the court did not think a man pushing
a vehicle could be considered "upon" it.
The difficulty with this literal interpretation of the word "upon"
25. North America Ins. Co. v. Ellison, 37 Tenn. App. 546, 267 S.W.2d 115
(E.S. 1954).
26. 327 S.W.2d 66 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1959).
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is neatly stated by a New York court:
An examination of the word "upon" in the particular context in which
it is found indicates its meaning is related to the idea of use of the
automobile ....

Can it be said that the insurer attached to the word

"upon" a meaning so narrow as to encompass only such cases in which
the entire weight of a person's body was resting upon or supported by
the vehicle? Considering the usual positions of a person in relation
to a car in use and the fact that other enumerated risks include acts of
being upon the automobile in the sense of resting upon or being supported by it, it is reasonable to give the term a broader meaning 27including some acts in which the person is in contact with the car.
Virtually8 all the decided cases follow this broader use of the term
"upon."
Thus, an insured has been held to have been "upon" the
vehicle when he was grasping the taillight in one hand and the license
plate in the other to prevent the car from rolling away; 29 or placing a
flat tire in the trunk of the automobile; 30 or kneeling by the vehicle
taking off or putting on the wheel; 31 or tying on a bumper which
had fallen off; 32 or closing the hood of the vehicle.33 Indeed, even
beyond these cases which interpret "upon" to mean "in contact with"
are some decisions not even requiring contact in this sense.M The
Tennessee decision finds its sole support in a Missouri case decided in
1918, holding that an insured is not "in or on" a vehicle when he is
cranking it.35
If a man pushing an automobile is not "upon" it, is a man attempting to apply the emergency brake from the running board of a
vehicle "driving or riding" in the vehicle? The insurer in Inter Ocean
Ins. Co. v. Norris36 contended that he was not, and cited an earlier
27. Lokos v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 93 N.Y.S.2d 825, 826 (1959).
28. In Henderson v. Hawkeye Sec. Ins. Co., 103 N.W.2d 89 (Iowa 1960) the
court allowed recovery under this clause to an insured who was closing
the hood of the vehicle when struck. The court observed that "by the clear
weight of authority actual physical contact with the automobile, when shown,
is sufficient to entitle one to recover. It is the rule generally recognized that
such words as 'while in or upon' in an insurance policy of this nature require a broad and liberal construction." Id. at 92.
29. Sherman v. New York Cas. Co., 78 R.I. 393, 82 A.2d 839 (1951).
30. Madden v. Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 82 Ohio App. 111, 79
N.E.2d 586 (1948).
31. Christoffer v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 123 Cal. App. 2d 979, 267
P.2d 887 (1954).
32. Lokos v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., supra note 27.
33. Henderson v. Hawkeye Sec. Ins. Co., 103 N.W.2d 89 (Iowa 1960).
34. Katz v. Ocean Ace. & Guarantee Corp., 112 N.Y.S.2d 737 (1952) (insured
alighted from car and ran to rear where she was crushed between her car
and one parked behind it); Wolf v. American Cas. Co., 2 Ill. App. 2d 124,
118 N.E.2d 777 (1954) (insured returning to his car and two or three feet
from it struck when another car knocked his car into him). Contra: Green
v. Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 139 W. Va. 475, 80 S.E.2d 424 (1954)
(car fell on insured when he turned to grasp wooden block).
35. Turner v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 274 Mo. 260, 202 S.W. 1078 (1918). See
Annot., 39 A.L.R.2d 952 (1955).
36. 326 S.W.2d 437 (Tenn. 1959).
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Tennessee case 37 to the effect that one riding on a running board was
not "actually riding" in the vehicle. While the court thought the
policy in the instant case was broader-the word "actually" not
appearing-its decision for the insured did not rest on that distinction.
The court found that the insured was "driving" the vehicle when,
from whatever location, he was attempting to operate the controls.
The third case, American Casualty Co. v. Cutshall,38 raises the question of whether the driver of a motorcycle has been "struck by an
automobile" when his machine collides with an automobile throwing him over the hood of the car and onto the pavement. The insurer
contended that actual personal contact with the automobile was
necessary and established that the motorcycle driver at no time
actually touched the automobile.
In support of this position are cases like Johnson v. Maryland
Casualty Co. 39 (holding that a truck driver is not "struck by an
automobile" when his truck collides with a passenger car, absent the
driver's personal contact with the passenger vehicle) and Harley v.
Life & Casualty Ins. Co.40 (holding that one struck by a nut which
had become detached from the wheel of a passing automobile was not
"struck by an automobile"). The court, however, followed the
Tennessee case of Maness v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co.41 which
allowed recovery where the insured was struck by a rock thrown
by a passing vehicle. In holding that actual contact with the vehicle
was not necessary to constitute being "struck," the court in the
instant case said, "it is logical to conclude that what the parties had
in mind was insurance against injuries inflicted by a blow in which
the automobile participated. '42 The possible breadth of "participation" as a standard will no doubt be diligently explored by plaintiffs'
counsel in the future. In can be expected that limits will be gradually
developed on a case by case basis.
The issue presented by Slomovic v. Tennessee Hospital Service
Ass'n,43 decided in 1958 and discussed in last year's survey, 4 received
further attention from the Tennessee courts during the present
survey period. In Slomovic, the insured sought to recover from a
hospital service insurer medical expenses incurred in excess of the
amounts received for the same injury from his employer's workmen's compensation carrier. The hospital service contract, however,
37. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Rust, 164 Tenn. 22, 46 S.W.2d 70 (1932).
38. 326 S.W.2d 443 (Tenn. 1959).

39. 22 Wash. 2d 305, 155 P.2d 806 (1945).
40. 40 Ga. App. 171, 149 S.E. 76 (1929).
41. 161 Tenn. 41, 28 S.W.2d 339 (1930).

42. 326 S.W. at 445.

43. 313 S.W.2d 265 (Tenn. 1958).
44. Andersen, Insurance-1959 Tennessee Survey, 12 VAN.

(1959).

L. REV. 1213
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provided no benefits for injuries "for which the subscriber ... re-

ceives any award or any settlement in any proceeding under Workmen's Compensation laws.... ." Thinking this exclusion clearly barred
plaintiff's claim, the insurer demurred to the complaint. The chancellor overruled the demurrer and, on a discretionary appeal, the
supreme court affirmed. The high court considered the exclusion
ambiguous when coupled with the averment of plaintiff's bill ("admitted" by the demurrer) that the contract provided coverage for
expenses in excess of the compensation award. On remand, the
chancellor, following the opinion of the supreme court, treated the
exclusion as ambiguous, construed it as not preventing recovery for
expenses in excess of the compensation payments, and awarded
plaintiff $390.94.
On appeal to the court of appeals, however, the decision was reversed and the bill dismissed. 45 Unable to find any ambiguity in the
exclusion, the court of appeals flatly observed:
We think this exclusion clause is not ambiguous. It clearly excludes
from the policy's coverage hospital benefits for injuries or diseases
for which the insured is entitled to "any hospital care or for which he
receives any award or settlement in any proceeding under Workmen's
Compensation laws." That is, it excludes benefits for injuries covered
by the Workmen's Compensation Law, even though the benefits claimed
are in excess of those provided by that law.46
In spite of the attempt to accommodate the supreme court's opinion
in the first Slomovic case,47 it seems clear that the dominant implication of that case has been discarded by the court of appeals. The
supreme court denied certiorari.
The problem came up in slightly different form in State Farm
Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Rice,48 where the supreme court held
that a claimant under the medical payments coverage of an automobile liability policy was barred by a workmen's compensation exclusion even though claimant had not in fact received any
compensation payments. The policy excluded injuries "if benefits
therefor are in whole or in part either payable or required to be
provided under any workmen's compensation law." Finding no ambiguity in the exclusion, the court held that it would prevent recovery
45. Slomovic v. Tennessee Hosp. Serv. Ass'n, 333 S.W.2d 564 (Tenn. App.

M.S. 1959).
46. Id. at 566-67.

47. Judge (now Justice) Felts held that there was no longer ambiguity
in the exclusion because the averment in the plaintiff's original bill as to
excess coverage "was denied by the answer, and shown by the proof to be
untrue. The proof showed that ... [the policy] contained no such provision

as that averred in the bill." Since the original bill did not contain the
entire policy (only the exclusion clause) the supreme court, in Judge Felts'
view, could quite properly have considered the exclusion ambiguous.
48. 326 S.W.2d 490 (Tenn. 1959).
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even though the claimant was unable to collect the workmen's compensation award due to the wrongful act of his employer-insurer.
Since under the Tennessee statute compensation payments in this
case were "required to be provided," the court said the claim fell
"strictly within the language of this exclusionary clause" whatever
49
the actual status of claimant's compensation award.
B. Other Risk Control Techniques
Having defined the insured event, an insurer may wish to still
further limit the risk. One possible method is by the use of warranties-provisions making the policy voidable upon the happening of
certain conditions considered to be potential causes of the insured
event. A modern variation of the warranty is the suspensive condition
or "while" clause, which suspends coverage during the existence of
the named condition.
In Foote Mineral Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co.,50 the policy covering
loss to an industrial generator provided that there was no coverage
while the generator was not "in use or connected ready for use." Nor
was there coverage while the generator was being "repaired." The
generator in question was in position "on the line" and was being
turned by a motor at the time the fire occurred. But it was not being
used to produce current. Instead, it had been disconnected and its
commutator was being ground-a routine facet of generator service
sometimes occurring as often as every six months. Since grinding the
commutator was a normal operation incident to the use of a generator,
plaintiff contended that the generator was "in use." Further, the
plaintiff argued that the work being done on the machine was not
"repair" but rather "maintenance"-the distinction suggested depending upon the condition of the machine when the work was begun.
If the machine was actually broken down the work was "repair."
Where, however, as in this case, the machine was in working condition when the work was begun, the work was merely "maintenance."
The court disagreed with both of plaintiff's arguments. Finding both
phrases plain and unambiguous, the court considered itself bound
by their ordinary meanings. "The usual and ordinarily understood
meaning of an object being 'in use' is when said object is being used
for the purpose for which it was designed." The generator was designed to produce current and, since it was not performing this function at the time the fire occurred, it was not "in use." Further the
court found that the ordinary meaning of "repair" was "to restore to
49. For a discussion of the scant authorities in other jurisdictions see
Andersen, Insurance-1959 Tennessee Survey, 12 VA D. L. Rav. 1213, 1217
(1959); Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 107 (1956).
50. 173 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Tenn. 1959).

1154

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 13

sound condition" and that "that which was being done . . . on the
generator at the time of the accident fits the . . .definition."
The circuit court of appeals affirmed (3-2).51 The opinion of the
dissenting judges accepted both contentions made by the plaintiff
at the trial.
The fire insurance policy in McCaleb v. American Ins. Co.52 suspended coverage while the premises were vacant or unoccupied for
more than sixty days. The policy and the property insured had been
transferred to the plaintiff at a time when the premises were vacant
to the knowledge of the insurer. More than sixty days after the
transfer, (during which time the property remained vacant) the fire
occurred. Over plaintiff's objection that the insurer had waived any
breach of the vacancy clause by transferring the policy to him with
knowledge of the breach, the trial court directed a verdict for the
insurer.
The supreme court began with the settled rule that "knowledge by
the insurer's agent that the premises are vacant at the time the
policy is issued does not waive a breach arising from vacancy continuing thereafter for a period in excess of that permitted by the
policy ....,,53 At the same time, the court observed the rule that if
the policy is issued with knowledge of the vacancy and. "upon an
agreement or with the expectation on the part of the insurer and the
insured that the property is to remain vacant, the clause against
vacancy is deemed waived." 54 The court considered the existence of
such an agreement (under the somewhat obscure facts of this case55 )
to be a question for the jury and remanded for a new trial.
III. MARKETING

AND SERVICING INSURANCE

A. Making the Contract
Ordinarily there is no problem in determining what the terms of
an insurance contract are-the dispute is usually about their application and interpretation. Because of the nature of insurance marketing, however, problems of this kind can arise. Under modern as well
as ancient practice, many insurance contracts begin as simple oral
agreements: the (duly authorized) agent tells the applicant that he
is immediately covered, then proceeds to obtain the written policy
which is thus issued after the risk has attached. Should a loss occur
51. 277 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1960).
52. 325 S.W.2d 274 (Tenn. 1959).

53. Quoting from Annot., 96 A.L.R. 1259, 1266 (1936).
54. Conley v. Queen Ins. Co., 256 Ky. 602, 76

S.W.2d 906, 907 (1934).

55. The court observed: "Due to the very careless and irregular manner
employed by the parties in their handling of a transaction very material to
the outcome of this controversy, this Court cannot be completely satisfied with
whatever decision it makes." 325 S.W.2d at 275.
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before the policy is issued, a question may arise as to what the terms
of the contract are.
In Dixon v. Pickle56 a student had applied to an agent for an
automobile liability policy and was told that he was covered immediately. The student loaned his car to another student who
injured plaintiff in a collision. After obtaining a verdict against the
student driver, plaintiff proceeded against the insurer. The company
resisted liability on the ground that its policy (issued after the
accident) contained a "student risk endorsement" which limited the
omnibus coverage of the contract to members of the student owner's
immediate family. Thus the driver of the vehicle was not an insured
under the contract.
The seminal rule is that the terms of an oral contract, absent
express agreement to the contrary, are presumed to be the terms of
the policy either "ordinarily used by the company" 57 or "usually
issued to cover like risks. '58 It has been observed that discrimination
between these two alternatives has seldom been necessary but that
should it become necessary the former alternative would probably
be chosen. 59 The company here proved that it had been in the
practice of including the student risk endorsement on all student
policies for a period of five years pursuant to a published company
directive. Therefore, it contended, the contract with the student risk
endorsement was the policy "ordinarily issued by the company."
The court, however, construed the rule to read "issued by the company through this agent." Finding that the company had never
notified the agent of its practice, and that there was no proof that the
student risk endorsement had appeared on any prior policy issued
by the agent, the court allowed the jury to find for the plaintiff.
A variation of this problem arose in Henry v. Southern Fire &
Casualty Co., 60 where the agent had allegedly told the insured that his
logging operation was fully protected by liability insurance. The
policy issued covered the insured's trucks, but not his trailers. Although this fact was apparent on the face of the policy 6' the court
held that if he could establish the representation by the agent,
plaintiff was entitled to indemnification for payments made to a third
56. 327 S.W.2d 50 (Tenn. App. E. S. 1959).
57. This phrase was quoted by the court from 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 230
(1945).
58. See Annots., 15 A.L.R. 995 (1921); 69 A.L.R. 559 (1930); 92 A.L.R. 232
(1934).
59. PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW 89 (2d ed. 1957).
60. 330 S.W.2d 18 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1958).
61. As to which the court said: "[T]he insurer is not entitled to invoke the
rule that the negligence of the insured in failing to read and understand
the policy, and in retaining it,

will preclude relief in

equity. .

.

. [A]n

insured has a right to rely on the good faith of the insurer and his agent ......

Id. at 33.
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person who had been injured by one of insured's trailers. This was
not a reformation of the contract for mistake, said the court; it was
allowing recovery under the general insuring agreements of the
policy, the insurer being estopped by the conduct of'its agent from
relying on the terms of the trailer exclusion.
B. Dispositionof Claims
In CentralNational Ins. Co. v. Home 62 an insurer sought to recover
from its insured the amount paid on a collision claim, the insurer
contending that by failing to attend the trial of a subrogation suit
brought by the company against a third party the insured had
breached his obligation to cooperate with the company. The court
held that the cooperation clause 63 "has to do with cooperation with
the company on the part of the insured at trials of cases brought
against the insured .... [and] apparently, does not contemplate the
situation that has arisen in the case at bar." 64 Nor could the company
premise its case on the subrogation clause through which it received
its rights against the third party and which obligated the insured
to "do whatever else is necessary to secure such rights." The court
said simply that the "record showed that the defendant, insured, did
comply with this agreement," which apparently means that attending
the trial of the subrogation suit was not "necessary."
The court went on to say that even if there was a duty to cooperate in the subrogation suit, there was no breach of the duty (the
facts indicated "some excuse" for insured's failure to attend the
trial), or the breach had not been proved prejudicial ("record does
not show how many, if any, other witnesses to the same facts . . .
known by the defendant, were available to plaintiff"), or that even
if there was a prejudicial breach of an existing duty, the damages
claimed were speculative (in view of third party's counter claim).
These last two dicta raise the possibility that the Tennessee court has
taken a position on the question of whether or not an insurer must
prove prejudice before a breach of cooperation by the insured relieves
it of obligation under the policy. Prejudice (or, as it is sometimes
phrased, a "material" breach) is required by a majority of the
jurisdictions which have passed on the question 65 although there is
some persuasive authority to the contrary, 66 including a dictum in a
62. 326 S.W.2d 141 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1959).
63. Requiring that the insured "shall cooperate with the company and . . .
shall attend hearings and trials.... ." (Id. at 144).
64. Id. at 145.
65. Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1146, 1154 (1958).
66. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Keller, 17 Ill. App. 2d 44, 149 N.E.2d 482 (1958);
Coleman v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 247 N.Y. 271, 160 N.E. 367 (1928)
(opinion by Cardozo, J.).
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recent Tennessee case. 67 The problem is discussed in detail elsewhere
68
in this issue.
67. Pennsylvania Ins. Co. v. Homer, 198 Tenn. 445, 281 S.W.2d 44 (1955).
68. Keeton, Ancillary Rights of the Insured Against His Liability Insurer,
13 VAND. L. Ray. 837, 847-51 (1960).

